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Florin Frant 
Beyond  the  Lisbon  Strategy:  Information  Techno-
logies for the Sustainable Knowledge Society 
The  first  part  of  the  present  paper  posits  the  emerging  concept  of 
‘nano bio info cogno  convergence’  as  providing  a  basis  for  a  new 
cluster of technological innovations for human enhancement and  social 
change  in  the  context  of  modern  developments  in  information 
technology. The second part of the paper reviews some deep economic 
and social trends that pertain to the emerging concept of a ‘Sustainable 
Knowledge  Society’  (SKS).  These  trends  include  the  nature  of  work, 
global environmental and ecological issues, education and learning, the 
role of services, and the nature of the welfare state. The final part of 
the  paper  is  devoted  to  the  economic  implications  of  these  new 
technological and socio economic scenarios. The  paper considers these 
matters  in  general  terms  and  in  terms  of  applied  policy 
recommendations.  
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1.  Introduction  
Although the time required for a technological development to move from 
the  laboratory  to  the  market  is  shortening,  it  still  remains  true  that  broad 
technological change is a long term affair. For example, the successful implemen 
tation of the innovation of mobile phones has required more than twenty years to 
achieve maturity in the advanced industrial countries. 
Although many economists had been interested in the great fluctuations that  were 
observable in prices and rates of economic growth over the first two centuries of 
the  industrial  era,  it  was  Schumpeter  who  associated  business  cycles  with  the 
discontinuous behaviour of technological developments and  innovation (Freeman, 
1996; Fontela & Pulido, 1991). Schumpeter had been in contact with Walras, and 
was sceptical of the prevailing notion of ‘static general equilibrium’. Since his early 
doctoral research project, Schumpeter had been of the opinion that economics had  
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to  incorporate  more  dynamic  considerations  and  that  economic  dynamism  was 
linked to entrepreneurial innovative capacity. He envisaged two possible models for 
the role of technology in these entrepreneurial innovative strategies. These can be 
summarised as follows: 
   The  first  was  that  technology  emerged  from  science  without  further 
explanation, and was available o innovating entrepreneurs in a ‘pool’ of techno 
logical  opportunities—a  view  that  was,  in  a  sense,  coherent  with  the  classical 
economic idea of small entrepreneurs acting in free competition. 
   The  alternative  model  was  tha  technology  resulted  from  a  conscious 
research investment on the part of the entrepreneurs. This was part of their quests 
for temporary monopolistic positions that would allow them to increase their profit  
rates  above  market driven  averages.  This  second  (‘endogenous’)  model  of 
technological change led to Schumpeter being  characterised as a  promoter of 
large corporations with high market power. 
In some respects, these two views of the entrepreneur’s strategies reflect 
what are now known as: the ‘supply–push’  conception of technological change 
(analogous to the ‘pool’ of available  technologies noted in the first model above); 
and  the  ‘demand–pull’  conception  of  such  change  (analogous  to  the  conscious 
research  investments  for  ‘endogenous’  technologies  noted  in  the  second  model 
above). Although there are no special references in these models to factors that 
could cause sudden discontinuities, Schumpeter’s intuitive belief that technological 
change is linke to long term cycles requires analysis that  takes into account  the 
essential characteristics of the technological production system—in  particular, the 
existence of links between technological innovative developments and economies 
of scale and  economies of scope (Wolff, 1997). In this regard, the concept of 
‘clusters  of  technologies’  has  been  used  by  neo Schumpeterians,  such  as  Pérez 
(2002),  in  their  analyses  of  cyclical  paths  and  technological  discontinuities. 
Similarly, neo classical scholars have conceived the notion of technological ‘chocks’ 
causing temporary disturbances of the genera equilibrium  of economic systems 
(Adelman, 1965; Verspagen & Werker, 2003). 
Allowing for the limits of historical analysis, and assuming that the past  
existence  of  these technological ‘clusters’ ca  be established (Bruland, 1998), the 
question arises as to whether future technological clusters can be predicted for the 
first half of the twenty first century. If so, can these clusters provide a reasonable 
basis for a long wave of economic growth? Moreover, what public policies could 
support these long term evolutions in science, technology, and economics? 
 
2.  Technology trends and key new technologies 
 
Because technological advances play a central role in shaping the future, 
the forecasting of technological change has received considerable attention. This 
has been particularly so since the Second World War, when the rate of economic 
growth has increased in the advanced industrial countries well above that achieved   158 
in the previous two centuries. An influential OECD report  by Jantsch (1967) on 
technological forecasting gave impetus to the concept of ‘future scenarios’. This 
report emphasised the importance of rigorous methodology in achieving consensus 
among  expert  opinions  on  future  developments  (Delphi,  morphological  analysis, 
cross impact, and so on) if such foresight was to complement  the more traditional 
methods of trend modelling and extrapolation (S curbs, system dynamic models, 
causal econometrics, and so on). The future is, and will remain, unknown however, 
the analysis of alternative futures and the development of hypotheses about trends 
and events (including purposeful actions) can be of great  importance in decision 
making  processes—including  those  relating  to  research  investments  for  the 
development  of  new  technologies.  Jantsch  (1967)  made  a  clear  distinction 
between  exploratory  scenarios  (possible  and  more   or less  probable  future 
alternatives  emerging  from  current  anticipations)  and  normative  scenarios 
(desirable  futures  in  relation  to  some  set  of  social  values,  and  often  linked  to 
clearly stated policy aims). This distinction, although essential for all exercises in 
foresight, is not alway  made. For example, the Lisbon Strategy of  the European 
Union envisaged the scenario of an  SKS’, but it is often unclear whether this was 
intended to be an exploratory scenario derived from current trends (and therefore 
seeking  reactive  decisions),  or  a  normative  scenario  establishing  clear  aims  for 
European policies (and therefore seeking proactive decisions). 
In the area of technological foresight, research effort in recent years has 
concentrated  on  collecting  the  views  of  experts,  usually  through  Delphi 
consultations. The process has thus been essentially exploratory. Many countries 
(including  the  United  Kingdom,  Japan,  Germany,  France,  and  most  other  EU 
members)  have  engaged  in  large  Delphi  exercises  in  technological  foresight  or 
have established groups of experts to identify key future developments in techno 
logy. The fact that these various studies have produced many similar results is 
clearly  a  consequence  of  the  globalisation  of  scientific  and  technological 
information. 
In a recent initiative by the EU Commission, a high level group of experts 
synthesised the core of the available foresight information to present a set of ‘New 
Technologies’  that  were  expected  to  have  significant  potential  for  future 
innovations (EC 2005). This selection of technologies, well adapted to the current 
practice of EC research policies, included research activities that were both ‘supply 
pushed (scientific developments likely to lead to new technological proposals) and 
‘demand pulled’ (social and economic problems that required  new technological  
solutions). The distinction is not always clearcut, but those that can be described  
as mainly ‘supply pushed’ (in which creativity is driven from inside the discipline) 
include:  nanotechnologies,  biotechnologies,  infotechnologies,  cognitive  sciences, 
the methodological area of complexity. 
Those that can be described as essentially ‘demand pulled’ (in which the more 
creative  aspects  rely  on  the  application  of  available  knowledge)  include:   159 
manufacturing,  agriculture,  services,  environment,  communication,  transport, 
energy, health, and security. 
In  this  schema,  the  social  sciences  and  the  humanities  (which  are  here 
characterised as part of the ‘cognitive sciences’) are expected to fulfil the difficult 
task of establishing bridges between supply and demand of future technologies. 
 
  3. Economic and social trends 
 
  For  a  new  technology wave to  develop, it is not sufficient to have supply 
pushed technologies. Nor is it sufficient to have a clear picture of where demands 
for innovation reside. Rather, the new technologies have to be adopted by society, 
by culture, and by institutions. Growth  and development can be achieved only 
when a perfect match is achieved between new technologies and the economic 
and  social  context in which  they are to be applied (Fontela, 1998). 
A ‘new wave’ necessarily concerns the future. It is therefore necessary to 
investigate the changing nature of the economic and social context, and to identify 
possible long term trends. The following account describes the present situation in 
terms  of  a  ‘New  Economy’  model  that  appears  to  be  instrumental  for  the  full 
development of a ‘Sustainable Knowledge Society’. 
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3.1. From the industrial model to the ‘New Economy’ model 
The  EU  ‘Lisbon Strategy’ states long term aims for European  growth and  
employment. In defining an ‘SKS’, the strategy is stating a desirable and normative 
future  for  the  economy  and  for  society—a  future  to  be  matched  with  feasible 
technological developments. The concept of an SKS is not utopian; rather, it is a 
logical step in a process of social change that started with the Industrial Revolution 
more than two centuries ago. 
The early stages of the industrial process were characterised by growing 
capital  accumulation  that  fostered  workers’  productivity  and  improved  living 
standards. The process was stimulated by public policies and market mechanisms, 
and  by  the  relative  costs  of  production  and  prices  of  goods  and  services.  In 
general,  environmental  protection  and  sustainability  were  disregarded,  and 
knowledge  focused  on  the  capital  to  be  gained  through  new  products  and 
production processes. 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, several aspects of this growth 
process in the advanced industrial countries began to change, and a new direction 
pointed towards the issues of sustainability and knowledge development.  
Labour productivity growth (the ratio of the output of objects per unit of 
human input), which is an end product of new technologies, contributed to relative 
costs and prices. The  products of highly productive activities were decreasing in 
price,  whereas  the  prices  of  stagnant  productivity  activities  were  increasing. 
Sustainability, services, and quality were becoming relatively more expensive in the 
markets. These deep seated drivers of relative prices were forcing the advanced   160 
industrial  economies  towards  ecological  imbalances.  Economic  growth  was 
dependent  on  increasing  use  of  non renewable  energy  and  materials  through 
consumption  and  accumulation  of  objects,  and  environmental  decay  became 
apparent through pollution and over use. 
The advanced industrial economies also began to suffer from the so called 
‘Baumol syndrome’ of unbalanced growth (Baumol, 1967), and from a  consequent 
move of employment towards the less productive services sector. As anticipated by  
Baumol  (1967),  this  produced  a    slow  down  in  the  overall  rates  of  growth  of 
productivity  and  of  the  economy—as  activities  with  high  rates  of  productivity 
growth  lost  ‘weight’  in  the  total  structure,  and  as  the  responsibility  for  growth 
leadership was transferred to sectors with low average productivity and  slow rates 
of  productivity  growth.  The  growth  process  peaked  in  the  advanced  industrial 
countries at the end of the 1960s.  
At the end of the twentieth century, the emerging paradigm of information 
and communication technologies profoundly affected these long term  evolutionary  
processes  within  advanced  industrial  societies.  Three  significant  effects  can  be 
discerned. 
First,  the  new  paradigm  of  information  technology  placed  information 
products at the centre of the production and consumption models. In so doing, 
energy and resources no longer represented the core factor in advanced industrial 
models.  The  new information  activities  were  relatively more  intangible  than the 
erstwhile  emphasis  on  the  physical  production  and  consumption  of  objects. 
Information  technology  addressed  the  information  content  of  objects,  and  this 
came to represent a larger share of their added value. Information technologies 
generated  income  and  wealth  with  less  pressure  on  the  finite  resources  of  the 
earth. 
Secondly,  the  new  paradigm  produced  technologies  that  enhanced 
productivity  inpreviously  stagnant  activities.  Information  technologies  have 
profoundly  changed  many  basic  services  in  networks  (communications,  trading, 
transportation),  business  services  (finance,  insurance,  consulting,  auditing, 
advertising), and many personal services (medicine, health care). 
Thirdly,  the  new  paradigm  has  stimulated  institutional  change  by 
promoting global efficiency in the meeting of supply and demand.  The ‘big  bang’  
of financial globalisation is the pre  eminent example of this phenomenon—with 
the  combination  of  financial  market  liberalisation  and  information  technology 
producing a revolution in international financing. 
These profound changes fully justify the emergence of the concept of a 
‘New Economy’ at the end of the twentieth century in the USA. The concept came 
to  be  erroneously  associated  with  the  speculative  financial  ‘bubble’  that 
accompanied numerous failed information and telecommunications ventures. But 
this erroneous association masked the real (and valid) content of the concept (as 
will be explored in the following paragraphs).   161 
Under  the  ‘New  Economy’  model,  the  ‘Baumol  disease’  seems  to  have 
found a cure. After the long (predicted) productivity slowdown of the 1970s and 
1980s, US productivity has started to increase. A close analysis of the US model 
shows that  large productivity  gains in the industrial sectors have been  directly 
associated with the production of information and communication ‘objects’. This 
has been complemented by a productivity upsurge in many service sectors that 
were  previously  part  of  the  ‘stagnant’  economy,  but  which  have  now  become 
highly innovative users of the new technologies.  
The growth model of the ‘New Economy’ synthesises th convergence of the 
three main schools of contemporary economic thinking: 
   from the Schumpeterians, the model takes the leading role of entrepre 
neurial innovation and the functioning of technological systems, and  confers high 
priority to research  and development (R&D) policies,  
   from the neo classicists, the model takes the ‘perfect market’ idea for 
the  allocation  of  the  dividends  of  innovation,  and  heavily  relies  on  intensive 
competition, and 
     from  the Keynesians,  it takes the  driving role of  new  demands and 
income multipliers, operating  in an expansionary  macro  economic context. 
  Through the new paradigm, hese three economic mechanisms are thus related 
in  what  appears  to  be  a virtuous  circle’  leading to  economic growth.  The  ‘New 
Economy’  model  suggests  that  the  appropriate  use  of  information  and 
communication technologies can stimulate a new wave of growth and employment 
in  the  advanced  industrial  societies—basically  relying  on  an  increase  in  the 
efficiency of service activities.  
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3.2.  From  the  ‘New  Economy’  model  to  the  ‘Sustainable 
Knowledge Society’ 
 
  The  ‘New  Economy’  model  is  characterised  by  highly  competitive  market 
frameworks, constant flows of innovations, and powerful property rights. In the 
advanced  industrial economies, the model has implied increased liberalisation and 
deregulation of markets, as well as the privatisation of many public functions.  
According  to  this  model,  economic  growth  is  associated  with  increasing 
disparities  in  income  and  wealth,  and  although  this  might  encourage  entrepre 
neurship it might also induce a loss of social cohesion. 
Because the fundamental growth process of this model depends on the 
rate  of innovation (especially in the low productivity sectors of the early industrial 
model), the process of capital accumulation that is characteristic of the model of 
industrial  growth  has  been  broadened  and  includes  three  additional  classes  of 
capital: technological capital, human capital, and social capital. 
These three forms of accumulation benefit from flows of research, educa 
tion, and organisational experience, and are subject to continuous obsolescence. 
The economic gains from innovations (Carter, 1990; Fontela, 1994), as portrayed   162 
by  the  growth  of  total  factor  productivity  (the  surplus  of  production  over  the 
increased  use  of  manpower,  equipment,  and  material  or  service  intermediate 
inputs), are a direct result of these three new processes of capital accumulation.  
Here again, te  processes of accumulation that are characteristic  of the 
‘New  Economy’ model have the  potential to produce disparities in income and 
wealth that, especially in the case of human capital, are linked to differences in 
access to knowledge by individuals. 
Furthermore, according to this model, there is no inherent reason to adopt 
policies to protect the environment or to reduce the use of  non renewable energy 
and materials. At a certain point, price mechanisms are expected to reflect such 
scarcities,  but  these  same  mechanisms  cannot  anticipate  the  final  substitution  
costs for these undesirable developments (because the market is necessarily short 
sighted).  
As a consequence, long term extrapolation of the ‘New Economy’ model 
leads to unsustainability—not so much in economic competitiveness, but in terms 
of social and environmental problems. 
Since the Second World War, with the adoption of the model of the ‘Social 
Market  Economy’  in  Germany  (Nichols,  1994;  Hieronymi,  2002),  and  with  the 
successful example of the ‘Nordic Welfare State’ (Buhigas& Martens, 2005), Europe 
has shown a preference for a more sustainable development  model—a  preference 
that has become more marked in the latter decades of the twentieth century with 
growing public concern for environmental issues. The ‘New Economy’ model has 
thus become oriented in Europe towards a ‘Sustainable  Knowledge Society’ (SKS). 
The  three  pillars  of  the  SKS  model  are:  the  economy,  society  and  the 
environment.  
From  this  conceptualisation,  it  is  possible  to  derive  three  long term 
objectives for sustainability: 
   innovation and growth in the economy, 
   creativity and human development in society,  
   protection and ecological balance in the environment. 
Although these objectives have received considerable attention and have 
been increasingly incorporated in European policy statements, such as those made 
at the Lisbon and Barcelona EU Council meetings, there is less clarity regarding the 
instruments to be used to meet the objectives.  
Emphasis has certainly been put on science and technology policies (for 
example, the importance given to the European Research Area). However, it must 
be  recognised  that  appropriate  technology  is  a  necessary,  but  not  sufficient, 
condition for the successful development of an SKS. 
The two other necessary conditions are values and prices. These are more 
difficult to define and implement. The term values refers to citizens’ preferences 
for cohesion, public services, quality, security, and so on. The term prices refers to 
the relative prices of ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’, of ‘green’ products and ‘dark’ products, 
and  of  ‘income’  and  ‘leisure’.  Recent  trends  in  ‘values’  and  ‘prices’  have  not   163 
necessarily been conducive to an SKS, and policies in these areas are not usually 
incorporated in the European `political agenda. However, only through a  perfect 
matching  of  prices,  values,  and  technology  can  a  successful  SKS  develop.  The 
stark reality is that an SKS is not in the mainstream of European society. 
 
3.3. Economic implications and policies for the new technology wave 
In the period of reconstruction after the Second World War, the  European  
and  Japanese  economic  models  included  the  active  participation  of  public 
administrations  in  the  development  of  productive  structures.  In  a  context  of 
market    economies,  it  was  still  considered  necessary  that  public  administration 
took part, directly or indirectly, in investment processes—to reduce enterprise risks 
and to guarantee the good operation of infrastructure, basic industrial sectors, and 
general  public services. This intervention was coherent with Keynesian policies of 
demand management, and with social  protection  and redistributive fiscal policies. 
With  the  liberalisation  of  the  capital  markets  from  the  1970s  onwards, 
economic  policies  began  to  favour  privatisation,  deregulation,  and  increasing 
competition. In these circumstances, the border between market and non market 
activities was  reconsidered. The institutional evolution of the European Union—
with  the creation of a single internal market, the Maastricht Treaty, and a single 
currency—also contributed to the redefinition of public functions. Traditional post 
war  industrial policies  have thus evolved with public  intervention being concen 
trated on keeping a balance in the macroeconomic framework. This public role in 
the  macro economy  continues in all countries of the OECD. However, new micro 
economic  support  policie  for  some    sectoral  interests  are    being    increasingly 
adopted—for  example,  policies  for  the  promotion  of  the  ‘Information  Society’ 
(which have many aspects in common with earlier industrial policies). These new 
microeconomic  policies  attempt  to  stimulate  the  competitive  capacity  of  certain 
firms, but they do no  include financial  assistance that distorts the functioning of 
markets. 
In  this  new  context,  scientific  and  technological  policies,  especially 
research&development (R&D) policies, have played a central role among public 
policy instruments for enterprise development. The justification for these policies 
can be summarised in the following logical steps: 
1. Globalisation: The well being of countries depends on the capacity of companies 
to compete in global markets. 
2. Competitiveness: The competitiveness of companies in these markets depends 
on constantly changing  factors—especially rapidly changing supply and demand. 
3. Adaptation: Success depends on the capacity of companies to promote or adapt 
to change, and the capacity to take reactive or proactive decisions with respect to 
innovation. 
4. Innovation: Access to new processes and new products is the key to innovation.   164 
5. Technological change and human capital: The technological changes that are 
required  occur  through  the  accumulation  of  technological  capital  and  human 
capital. 
6.  Research  and  higher  education:  The  scientific  and  technological  policies  of 
government  with  respect  to  research  and  highe  education  provide  generic 
knowledge  for  the  accumulation  of  technological  and  human  capital  within 
companies. 
The  results  of  ‘pure’ research  in the  basic sciences  continues  to  spread 
without  arriers  to  the  scientific  community  worldwide—as  it    has  always 
traditionally done. However, as ‘pure’ scientific research draws closer to applied 
technological innovation, the  results  of   basic  science become capable  of being 
appropriated by individuals or particular groups, and the economic justification of 
public  policies  with  respect  to  such  appropriation  becomes  more  difficult  to 
establish 
OECD countries are presently approaching this subject pragmatically, and 
there is a certain degree of competition among national systems of incentive to 
innovation.  There  are  thus  constant  fluctuations  in  scientific  and  technological 
policies with ministries being created and disbanded, decisions being concen trated 
and decentralised, fiscal incentives being introduced and withdrawn, and so on. 
In addition to having responsibility for trade policy and agricultural policy, 
the European Union has policy responsibilities in the area of scientific and technical 
research. These policies, supported with relatively modest budgets, have promoted 
greater cooperation among  national research institutions, and especially between  
universities  and    business.    However,  there  is  an  increasing  awareness  that, 
compared with the United States, Europe has been tardy in developing information 
technologies and in applying these technologies economically. This  has motivated 
concern  regarding  the  role  of  science,  technology,  and  innovation  in  European 
public policies. 
In March 2000, at the Summit of Lisbon, the European Union established, 
as  an  objective  for  2010,  to  become  “…the  most  dynamic  and  competitive 
knowledge   based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth 
with  more  and  better  jobs  and  greater  social  cohesion,  and  respect  for  the 
environment”. In support of this objective, the  Lisbon Strategy developed a set of 
interdependent  reforms  for  an  SKS.  Although  the  objective  of  the  projected 
“knowledge   based  economy”  was  not  specifically  defined,  most  interpretations 
refer, in general terms, to an economy in which innovative companies stimulate 
dynamism and competitiveness. 
However,  the reality in  2006 (at  the  midpoint of the  process  envisaged  by the 
Lisbon Strategy) was that the situation is not very different from what it was at the 
beginning: economic growth is  slow, unemployment of human resources is high, 
and there is a large deficit in the technology trade balance. In response to this, the 
EC has prepared several documents that propose new policies for the future.    165 
In  all  of  these  European  proposals,  it  is  apparent  that  there  is  often 
confusion  between  the  ‘Information  Society’  and    the  ‘Sustainable  Knowledge 
Society’.  Although  production  information  and  data processing  are  essential 
ingredients for a ‘knowledge economy’, a true SKS  has other characteristics that 
have to be taken into consideration in a modern European competitive strategy. 
These aspects are concerned with the matching of knowledge with quality, and 
they require an in depth revision of the familiar maximisation process that orients 
economic life.  
In  an  SKS,  social  cohesion and  sustainability  are fundamental concepts, 
and this means that the maximisation of utility and profit must  be accompanied by 
a parallel maximisation of: the quality of life, the creative capacity of individuals 
and the development of intelligence 
Structured on the basis of ‘work as a product’,  rather than ‘instrumental 
work’, an SKS thus requires a greater contribution from the social and cognitive 
sciences,  in  addition  to  the  expected  new  technological  convergence.  In  this 
respect, the concept of an SKS still lacks a comprehensive design. 
Nevertheless, because progress towards an economy of knowledge implies 
technological developments  in  education, health, security, and  protection of the 
environment  sectors  that  are  all  part  of  public  responsibilities  in  European 
countries a greater public role in R&D policies is justified. 
The  previous  sections  have  described  a  long term  future  scenario  for 
society (the SKS) and  for  technology  (the ‘new wave’ of NBIC convergence). For 
convenience, this  can be referred to as the  ‘SKS–NBIC’ scenario. In this long term 
scenario  (of  perhaps  fifty years), the Lisbon  Strategy  can  be  considered  as the 
policyagenda for the first decade. 
In  line  with  this    scenario,  four  main  policy  fields  that  require  conside 
ration (and  possibly urgent attention) can be identified: 
   socio technical systems, 
   research production structures, 
   cooperation processes, and 
   measurement issues. 
 
4.  Conclusions  
The ‘Lisbon Strategy’ for  developing a European ‘Sustainable Knowledge 
Society’ (SKS) has to incorporate a long term design. Such a design must describe 
aims  and  objectives  that  go  well  beyond  the  current  expectations  of  the 
‘Information Society’. An SKS cannot be expected to develop merely through the 
extrapolation of current  trends—which  already point  to unsustainable long term 
social divides and ecological catastrophes. 
Nevertheless, the ‘New Economy’ model is oriented towards the objectives 
of  an  SKS  and  it  can    provide  an  excellent  economic  framework  for  long term 
growth and employment. But, to be successful, the orientation of the economic   166 
system will require conscious public policies in areas such as health, education, 
environmental  protection,  and  security.  Such  policies  should  incorporate  the 
potential benefits of the coming new ‘technological wave’  induced by nano bi info 
cogno (NBIC) convergence. 
What is often considered to be current European competitive handicaps—
such  as  the  lack  of  market    size  due  to  significant  cultural  diversity  or  the  
excessive weight of non market activities in production and consumption—might 
turn out to be positive advantages for a post industrial SKS–NBIC societal design. 
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